‘PEACE IN OUR TIME’

By Norman Ridley

‘History doesn’t repeat itself [but] it rhymes.’

Mark Twain

‘Igitur qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum’

(therefore let him who desires peace prepare for war) ‘Epitoma rei militaris’

Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus 430-435 AD

When the German Chancellor Adolf Hitler, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, French President Édouard Daladier and Italian Duce Benito Mussolini met Munich on 29 September 1938 to discuss the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, no Czech representatives were present. They had turned up expecting to take part in the talks where they intended to vigorously defend their country’s right to remain independent and free of Nazi occupation but when they were ushered into an anteroom, the big oak doors were locked and, despite urgent protestations, they would not be let out again until the meeting was over.

The Czech government had, albeit reluctantly, accepted the conditions previously agreed upon by Britain, France, and Germany for a plebiscite but when Hitler later added new demands, the Czechs called them ‘absolutely and unconditionally unac­ceptable’.

The reek of betrayal had been in the air since 22 September when Chamberlain met Hitler and his Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop at the Rheinhotel Dreesen in Bad Godesberg. Chamberlain had opened discussions about proposals which Hitler himself had presented at a meeting a week earlier at the Berchtesgaden, but Hitler astounded him by interrupting him and making spurious accusations of Sudeten Germans being subjected to ‘oppression and terrorism’. He cast Chamberlain’s words aside saying he ‘could no longer discuss these things … the solution [was] no longer valid’. He withdrew his proposals and proceeded to give Chamberlain the main outlines of an alternative proposal, about which no previous discussions had taken place at all, and which Chamberlain had no prior knowledge of. This was a peculiar form of negotiation with which the Prime Minister had been hitherto unfamiliar. The meeting was effectively finished almost before it had started but Chamberlain knew he had to do more. He drew up a response to Hitler’s new demands in a letter and sent it from his Kurhotel on the other side of the Rhine to Hitler the next morning. Hitler replied, also in writing with what became to be known as the Godesberg Memorandum, in which he offered no modification at all of his proposals.

Whereas the original Anglo-French plan had proposed transfer of the Sudetenland areas after a plebiscite and included proposals for an international body to stipulate the exact borders and also arrange for transfer of populations who wished to relocate as a result, Hitler’s memorandum called for immediate occupation of areas shown on an accompanying map. These were to be completely evacuated by Czech soldiers and officials and occupied by German troops by 1 October. While the original proposal stated that the Czech state would afterwards be covered by an international guarantee, the Godesberg Memorandum made no mention of any guarantees. It simply gave the Czechs until 2pm on 28 September 1938 to agree, otherwise Germany would take the Sudetenland by force.

When Chamberlain and Hitler met again on the evening of 23 September they were joined by von Ribbentrop and other British diplomats. Chamberlain spoke ‘with all the emphasis at [his] command’ about the risks which would be incurred by insisting on the new terms and on the terrible consequences of a war and asked what concessions Hitler was willing to make. Hitler responded by stating that the fact he had not already ordered his troops across the Czech bor­der was concession enough.

He told Chamberlain he was grateful for his efforts but reiterated that he considered he had made a reasonable offer, giving Czechoslovakia much better terms than any which would have resulted from military conquest. Chamberlain got some comfort by Hitler saying, with great earnestness, that the Sudetenland was the last of his territorial ambi­tions in Europe. With solemn emphasis he added that he wanted to be friends with England and that if only this Sudeten question could be got out of the way in peace he would gladly resume conversations. Chamberlain took his words to be sincere and then two men parted on what seemed to be a friendly note.

When Chamberlain briefed the British Cabinet on 25 September, he portrayed Hitler in the most favourable light and interpreted his negotiating stance as novel but essentially honourable, despite having been humiliated in the most brutal way. Peace was obviously going to demand a price and he seemed ready to offer up his dignity as a down payment. It is hard to see how a man as experienced in politics as he was being taken in by Hitler when the evidence of his ruthlessness and mendacity must have been well known to him.

When the Cabinet meeting ended, Chamberlain and the British Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax met the Czech ambassador Jan Masaryk, who had just come off the phone to President Beneš. Masaryk handed them a strong note which criticised the fact that Czechoslovakia was being treated as ‘a vanquished nation [and not] a sovereign state’ adding that his country would never be ‘a nation of slaves…. We rely upon [you] to stand by us in our hour of trial.’ When Winston Churchill got wind of what was going he went to see Halifax at the Foreign Office. He again stated his opinion that Britain, France and the Soviet Union should make a clear declaration of support for the Czechs.

When Chamberlain went into the House of Commons to address Parliament, he looked exhausted and later admitted, as he went in to deliver his speech, that he was ‘wobbling about all over the place’, although whether he meant physically or emotionally is not clear. In sorrowful and apologetic tones he addressed his audience ‘all over the Empire, throughout the continent of America and in a large number of foreign countries’ saying that an ‘anxious and critical situation [ had arisen over] a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing’. ‘It was impossible’, he said, that a ‘quarrel which had already been settled in principle should [lead to] war…. If we have to fight it must be on larger issues than that.’

Chamberlain asked for Cabinet approval to urge Czechoslovakia to accept Hitler’s terms, but many refused to put their names to it while others signed in silent acceptance. Halifax called it tantamount to ‘complete capitulation’, which brought the matter to a close.

On the previous day, Hitler had written to Chamberlain giving details of modifications to his memorandum together with certain additional assurances. There was, for example, a definite statement that troops were only to preserve order, that the plebiscite would be carried out by a free vote under no outside influence, and that he would abide by the result, and, finally, that he would join the international guarantee of the remainder of Czechoslovakia once the minorities’ questions were settled. Chamberlain had no hesitation in taking Hitler at his word and that the differences between them were now so ‘narrowed down’ that it was really inconceivable that the matter could not be settled by negotiations. He replied saying ‘I cannot believe that you will take the responsibility of starting a world war which may end civilisation, for the sake of a few days’ delay in settling this long-standing problem.’

Mussolini sent an urgent message of support to Hitler but added that a momentary pause for reflection might be a good idea. Il Duce had also, in his message, proposed a four-party conference (no need to invite the Czechs) to which Hitler eventually agreed and ordered his troops on the Czech border to stand down. He did not do so without one of his customary rants against those who tried to thwart his ambitions but he could not afford to humiliate Mussolini by arguing with him in public and consoled himself by seeing it as no more than a momentary dislocation of his plans. Another day would make little difference.

When the meeting took place on 29 September, it was held in Hitler’s private study in the Führerbau in the Königsplatz but, whether by accident or design, preparations were far from complete. Given the normal efficiency of Hitler’s staff and his clear frustration at having to hold the meeting at all suggests that the latter is more likely, and a clear insult to his guests. Hitler had drafted the terms for discussion which were read out by Mussolini. Occupation of the Sudetenland, he said, would begin on 1 October, two days hence, and be completed within ten days, and an international commission would decide the future of other disputed areas. Hitler was visibly agitated and clearly frustrated that instead of entering the Sudetenland as a liberator at the head of his army on the day fixed by himself, he was going to have to give in to arbitration. His barely contained fury deterred any of the others present to suggest that the two Czech diplomats waiting nearby should be admitted to the conference room or consulted on the agenda. By late evening an agreement had been reached. The whole meeting was seen by Hitler as a complete waste of his time, but he had been obliged to go through with the charade to please Mussolini who was relishing the role of master of ceremonies.

Chamberlain was not satisfied, however, and requested a further meeting with Hitler on the following morning. This time they went to Hitler’s flat in the Prinzregentenplatz and presented Hitler with a declaration which he was invited to sign alongside the Prime Minister. The wording included a ‘desire … never to go to war again’. Hitler had little interest in the declaration and signed ‘only to please Chamberlain’. After all, as he told von Ribbentrop later in the day, ‘that piece of paper is of no significance whatsoever’, and he had just wanted to get Chamberlain out of his flat.

Czechoslovakia was informed by Britain and France that it could either resist Germany alone or submit to the prescribed annexations. The Czechoslovak government chose to submit.

Following the deal, Chamberlain was met on the streets of Munich with rau­cous applause, louder even than when the crowd welcomed the Fuhrer himself. Hitler, of course, hated this. He complained to Mussolini that Chamberlain had ‘haggled over every village and petty interest like a market-place stall keeper, far worse than the Czechs would have been! What has he got to lose in Bohemia? What’s it to do with him? He keeps talking about fishing at weekends. I never have weekends – and I hate fishing!’

Upon landing back in London, Chamberlain spoke to a cheering crowd at a rain-soaked Heston airport and told them that he had returned from Germany with:

settlement of the Czechoslovakian problem which [is] in my view, only the prelude to a larger settlement in which all Europe may find peace. This morning I had another talk with the German Chancellor, Herr Hitler, and here is the paper which bears his name upon it as well as mine. [on it is written] … We regard the agreement signed last night … as symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again.

Later, outside 10 Downing Street, he told a crowd he had brought back ‘peace with honour’. ‘I believe it is peace for our time,’ he said.

That’s not exactly how it worked out.

By Norman Ridley, author of Reading Hitler’s Mind.