Jellicoe's War (ePub)

"I really enjoyed reading Jellicoe’s War and found it extremely stimulating, especially as it tells the history of the U-boat war 1914-18 from the point of view of both sides, which is new. I also found it very interesting how controversial the introduction of the convoy system was still being discussed in the Admiralty in 1917 and how Sir John Jellicoe became convinced that there was no alternative. The significant role played by the USA's entry into the war is also made very clear here. Of course, the Royal Navy lacked escort ships for its many tasks and the many convoys. Now, from April 1917, these ships were ready and the success of the convoys was resounding, but you have to realize that first. The book is worth the read and knowledgeable. I recommend it."

Dr. Axel Grießmer, Internationales Maritimes Museum, Hamburg

"Marvellous."

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The Naval Review

"… meticulously researched and, unlike other attempts to simply document the tonnage achieved by German U-Boats in the First War, this book weaves together hundreds of stories of both cruelty and bravado on the high seas."

Admiral Jamie Foggo III USN ret’d

"For those seeking a ‘Deep Dive’ into the U-Boat war of 1914-18, Jellicoe’s War is for you."

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Australian Naval Institute

The sub title is “the U-Boat threat in WW1 And the Question of Convoy”. For the first nearly 2½ years of the war, merchant ships had sailed independently, relying on speed and luck to avoid submarines. As late as January 1917 the Admiralty had not recommended convoys, seeing large concentrations of ships as making successful submarine attack more likely. However, with growing losses of merchant ships, pressure was mounting on the Admiralty to adopt convoys, not least from Prome Minister Lloyd George. Jellicoe, who was now First Sea Lord, is often accused of obfuscating on the question of convoys but this book seeks to correct this. Jellicoe wasn’t opposed to the convoy system but he was only too well aware of the need to consider all the implications.

Nick Jellicoe’s latest book traces how Jellicoe from his time as CinC Grand Fleet was concerned about the submarine threat but was frustrated by the lack support for increased anti submarine forces and weapons. It was not only the threat to merchant shipping. In August 1916, Scheer laid a U-boat trap for the Grand Fleet with the High Seas Fleet working with Zeppelins and U-boats and whilst no major units were lost, Jellicoe had to restrict the Grand Fleet’s operations. Returning to the Admiralty in November 1916 as First Sea Lord, Jellicoe found that there was little understanding of the problem and little constructive policy; ASW tactics were “ramming, gunfire and nets”. However, the entry of America to the war provided vital number of destroyers and escorts. Another issue was getting merchant ships to comply with convoy requirements, something doubted by both the Admiralty and the Merchant Service. But in April 1917, Jellicoe decided to test the convoy system with promising results and in May the Admiralty agreed to introducing convoys. This belies the accusation of obfuscation. Yes, the Admiralty memo of January 1917 arguing against convoys was published on Jellicoe’s watch but he said he hadn’t endorsed that, and perhaps it is fairer to note that when he had the resources, he was quick to implement the convoy system.

Although the convoys and improved ASW saw a dramatic reduction in merchant ship losses by November 1917, Jellicoe was under increasing political pressure and in December 1917 was fired and replaced by Beatty. Nick Jellicoe has produced a deeply researched and highly readable book on the introduction of the convoy system. Did Jellicoe’s micro-management style cause unnecessary delay to its introduction or was he ensuring that the right resources were in place? As with Jutland, if Jellicoe got it wrong, Britain could lose the war. Jellicoe was said by Jackie Fisher to be a fighting Admiral wasted in London, not an unfavourable assessment of a “widely respected, highly credible professional naval officer”. Another masterly book from Nick Jellicoe - fascinating and stimulating covering not just the convoy debate side pieces on U-boat action accounts and technical explanations – very highly recommended.

Peter Wykeham-Martin