In the first part of this book, I summarize the development of the standard account of counterfactuals, i.e. conditionals of the form ‘If A had been the case, then B would have been the case’. In the standard account, a counterfactual is true if the then-sentence is true in all closest worlds in which the if-sentence is true. Closeness is spelled out by an ordering of worlds and by their similarities. In the second part of this book instead, I discuss challenges to the standard account: Firstly, I defend the standard logics for counterfactuals. Secondly, I discuss exemplary doubts whether conditionals have truth conditions. Thirdly I inquire into the interaction between truth and probability of counterfactuals. Then I discuss problems with the similarity ordering and with the interaction between counterfactuals and normalcy conditions. Finally, I close with elaborating peculiarities of future-directed counterfactuals.